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Book Reviews
Standards of American Legislation. By Ernst Freund, Professor of
Jurisprudence and Public Law in the University of Chicago.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 1917. pp.
XX, 327.

This book gives in somewhat expancded form the substance of a
series of lectures delivered at Johns Hopkins University in March,
1915.
The origin of the book explains its character: it is an essay of
constiuctive criticism, and not a systematic treatise. Its purpose
is to suggest the possibility of supplementing the established doctrine
of constitutional law which enforces legislative norms through ex post
facto review and negation by a system of positive principles that
should guide and control the making of statutes, and give a more
definite meaning and content to the concept of due process of law.
It is not a law book, although it deals entirely with courts and legislatures. It is rather an economic treatise covering the subject of the
relation of statute law to life, considered historically and philosophically, and as a problem of government as well as jurisprudence. It
addresses itself to the statesman rather than the lawyer, but it
deserves careful reading by every student of economics or law.
The learned author of "The Police Power" deals with modern welfare legislation, judicial decisions which check the onward course of
such legislation and the demand for a superior legislative product.
Does the due process clause of the federal constitution secure cardinal
principles of justice which do not change, or merely declare a fundamental policy of distributive justice which is entirely indefinite and
which changes with the process of economic and social thought? The
Ives case (201 N. Y. 271) proceeded on the theory that a just law
sustained by public opinion was void because it introduced a new rule
of compensation for industrial accidents but the latter theory of
legislative and judicial power is now favored by the courts. In Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, Mr. Justice Holmes says that
the police power may be put forth without constitutional amendment
in aid of what is "held by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the
public welfare." In Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, judge
Cardozo says, discussing the Sale of Goods in Bulk Act: "the needs
of successive generations may make restrictions imperative to-day
which were vain and capricious to the vision of times past," and concludes that that which to a majority of the judges in 19o5 seemed
arbitrary and purposeless, they can see now must have been a real
need. The court therefore adopted the conclusion of the dissenting
judges in Wright v. Hart (182 N. Y. 330) and affirmed the validity of
the statute there held unconstitutional. That which was unconstitutional in i9o5 had become constitutional by the gathered experience
of the interval of twelve years. The doctrine of judicial power over
statutes has thus developed from a mere following of precedent to a
shifting test of reasonableness, lacking in precision and clearness, but
seeking to follow, with somewhat lagging steps, any insistent and sustained public demand. Professor Freund indicates that the result of
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the empirical nature of this treatment of the subject is to oppose legislative discretion by judicial discretion and thus to destroy confidence
in all constitutional doctrines. He points out that courts swing from
illiberality (Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. supra, )to liberality (N. Y.
Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188) and back again in the
negation of legislative power, and he seeks to substitute some positive
principle for the unrelated decisions of isolated law suits. The condition seems an uncorrectible flaw in our form of government where
efficiency is not the first consideration. As Hamilton pointed out in
the Federalist, power given to the many invariably results in the
oppression of the few by the many and power given to the few results
in the oppression of the many by the few. That fundamental rights
of the few exist and should be safeguarded, none venture to deny.
That legislative justice has often been inferior to judicial justice is of
course true.
Constitutional limitations upon legislative power, being imposed by
the people, would be lightly worn if left to legislative interpretation,
nor would political rebuke from the electorate be expected if such
limitations were to be tested by political expediency only. If the
issue becomes a political one merely, the checks and balances of the
constitution are destroyed. If it remains a judicial one, courts will
continue to say in regard to one statutethat an appeal must be made
to the people and not to the courts to sustain it and in regard to
another that it is a proper restriction of personal liberty under the
police power of the state. The difference will often rest on the angle
from which a single judge views the question, which may depend upon
his college, legal or political training, his familiarity with or ignorance
of conditions of life in large cities, or the degree of his respect for
legislative bodies. If legislative discretion is the test, public opinion
and not the fundamental law controls. Widespread and long continued beliefs concerning matters of personal liberty may arise which
may be entirely opposed to the rights of the minority. The test of
public welfare is the constitution with its restrictions upon unlimited
legislative power, but the "application of the test depends upon the
mental attitude of the final arbiter. No perfect harmony can exist
between courts and legislatures when the question is one upon which
reasonable men may reasonably differ.
In the application of correct principles of constitutional law the
courts are exposed to a double danger,--of confusing public welfare
with public demand and of refusing to recognize that constitutional
law is a progressive science, and that the social structure is not
ossified. When the people accept the judicial decision, they approve
the firmness of the court in protecting the individual from confiscatory
legislation. When the decision is unpopular, it checks but slightly
the execution of the people's will. The courts should show undue
alacrity neither in holding that the constitution is a suggestive rather
than a binding force, nor in forcing an appeal to the people in doubtful
cases. Statutory policies should be construed with full comprehension of the social issues involved, and with slight consideration for the
wisdom of past generations as expressed in judicial decisions which
have become arbitrary and purposeless and out of keeping with the
spirit of the times. To condemn as unconstitutional legislation that
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corrects the individualistic tendencies of the common law, and to fail
to recognize that in the development of the modem state the community becomes more and more concerned in the common welfare of
its citizens, is to adhere to a reactionary policy long since discredited.
Our legal science has not developed an adequate system of principles of legislation and our political science hasnot attemptedto do so.
If statute law is to be respected as a rational ordering of human
affairs, the agreement of reasonable persons as expressed in legislation,
it must be something more than constitutional. Legitimate and
valuable interests should not be suppressed to meet a remote or
conjectural danger. Indefinite penal provisions, like the penalties of
the anti-trust laws, should be avoided. Statutes must harmonize
with one another and their satisfactory or just operation must be
provided for. To the disregard of such principles by the legislature,
to uncertainty, instability and lack of uniformity of statutes, rather
than to any essential'conflict with the constitution, may be attributed
many decisions holding legislation judicially unenforcible where a
sound legislative policy scientifically expressed might have been more
considerately dealt with. Experts in drafting statutes which shall be
constitutional, comprehensive and practical, are not numerous,
probably for the reason that there can be no incentive for that peculiar
kind of training with its toilsome preparation and infinite pains, so
long as the supply of legislative lead pencils remains undiminished.
The lack of proper standards of American legislation to which many
of its failures are chargeable, is due firstto the absence of definite and
comprehensive legislative policies and, secondly, to want of technical
knowledge of how successfully to translate -a given policy into the
terms of a statute. To stimulate interest in this subject and its vast
possibilities has been the aim of the author.
The Public Defender. By Mayer C. Goldman, of the New York Bar.
With a foreword by Justice Wesley 0. Howard. G. P. Putnams'
Sons, New York.

1917.

pp. xi, 96.

This small volume is an argument addressed to the public, for the
creation of an office of Public Defender, as "a necessary factor in the
administration of justice." It is claimed that injustice is constantly
being done to impecunious criminals who are unable to present properly the merits of their defenses, or the facts in extenuation of their
acts, under the present machinery of our courts.
The Public Defender would stand in relation to these persons as
does the District Attorney toward those interested in prosecuting
crime. Where the District Attorney, as a public official, accepts pleas
of guilty, attempts to convict by a trial or consents to a dismissal
according to his views of the merits, so the Public Defender, as a
public official, would advise the defendant to plead guilty, or would
attempt to secure an acquittal on a trial, or would make suitable
recommendations to the court, on behalf of those unable to secure
private counsel, according to his view of the merits of their case.
The author is a member of the New York Bar and has been active
in attempts to obtain legislation in this state favorable to this project,
and to provide for this office in the constitution framed by the last
convention. Thus far his efforts have been unavailing. He gives in
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the book a history of such an office in the judicial systems of different
states and countries; necessarily brief, it must be admitted. The
system of "assigned counsel" is attacked and disapproved. Public
prosecutors are criticized for undue zeal. The arguments of those
opposed to this reform are discussed with a view of discrediting them.
Prophesies of the onward step of this reform in criminal practice are
based on the favorable comments of those few who havehad experience
with it. Los Angeles County, California, seems to be the only place
where there has been any real trial of this experiment. There legislation establishing this office was obtained in 1913, and in January,
1914, a Public Defender was appointed. Specific facts are too meagre
in those places where there has been such an office to give to a candid
reader much impression of the value of this new scheme among the
many modem plans for social uplift.
No one can read the book without gaining a distinct opinion of the
author's sincerity, and of his serious devotion to the cause he advocates. If his theories seem somewhat fanciful at times and his
arguments not fully lawyer-like, it must be remembered that he is
addressing his arguments not to the profession but to a popular
audience.
He admits that bar associations and other similar bodies have not
been attracted toward this innovation, but he seems to have made
progress with "Public Forums," women's clubs and the like in advancing this propaganda, if one may judge by studying the chronology of
the movement in the appendix.
Very likely the test of time, in those places where the experiment is
being tried, will influence the public view as towhether thisisaneeded
reform in procedure or otherwise.
Handbook of the Law of Torts. By H. Gerald Chapin, Professor of
law in Fordhan University and New Jersey Law School. West
Publishing Co. St. Paul. 1917. pp. xiv, 695.
Jaggard on Torts is old and in two volumes: there was therefore, a
striking gap in the Hornbook Series for Chapin on Torts to fill. It
does rather more than fill the gap. One who wants to "refresh his
memory," as publishers euphemistically put it, on a tort topic of
importance, may pick up the book with strong hope of finding what he
wants and with confidence that what he finds will be supported by
citations that bear looking up. A useful mark of the recency of the
work is the considerable attention it devotes to the rapidly growing
subject of interference with business and labor relations (Chapter
xvi, "Interference with Contractual Rights"). A little less than
half the book is occupied by "Part I, General Principles," and a little
more than half, by "Part II, Specific Torts." The style is clear and
readable. The index, though not lengthy, is unusually useful.
H. W. E.
The Law of Eminent Domain. By Philip Nichols. 2d ed. Matthew
Bender & Co., Albany. 1917. 2 volumes. pp. cclii, 1577.
The first edition of this work was published in 1909 and was very
different in size and scope from the present edition. In the preface
to the first cdition the author declared the scope of the work to be
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"limited to fundamental principles which underlie the power of
eminent domain, define its extent, and restrict its exercise," and by
limiting the discussion to these topics the work was confined to a
volume of four hundred and twenty-two pages. The book was
favorably received, and has been very much used by the legal profession, but still the reviewers at the time of its appearance quite generally expressed disappointment that the author had not covered the
whole field of legal problems involved-the exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
In the preface to the present edition of the work, the author tells us
that the demand upon him "to cover all phases of the law of eminent
domain has been sufficiently insistent to induce him to attempt the
task, and the present treatise is the result." Through this change
of policy we now have a work of eighteen hundred and forty-two
pages, and the citation of over twenty thousand cases, a thirdof which
the author tells us, are not cited in any other discussion of the subject.
It is certain that members of the bench and bar will greatly appreciate the increased usefulness of Mr. Nichol's work, resulting from
its broadened scope. The chapters on the measure of compensation,
including the set-off of benefits, and the several chapters on procedure
in condemnation proceedings, will prove very generally useful, as well
as the author's more exhaustive treatment of constitutional questions.
The author is also to be commended for the very full index, which
makes the material contained in the two large volumes easily available
to the student or the practitioner.
C.K.B.

